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The Food Aid Debate in Trade and Development 
Andreas Schneider* 
 
It is generally agreed that making progress towards 
eradicating hunger worldwide is a moral obligation 
for the richer countries of the world. The instrument 
known as food aid is widely regarded as an 
important vehicle for providing assistance to needy 
countries. However, fresh debates in the present 
Doha round of WTO negotiations have brought a 
renewed interest in food aid issues. The Doha 
round is designed to put development at the 
centre of trade negotiations, and along with 
agriculture, to the fore among the contentious 
issues to be agreed.  
However, the issue of food aid elicits strong 
opinions from a number of perspectives ranging 
from major think tanks and significant donor 
governments to the development community 
and NGO stakeholders, and now more recently 
from among economists and influential 
members of the international financial 
institutions (IMF, World Bank and the WTO) 
charged with monitoring the efficiency of the 
international economy.  
At the core of the emerging debate among the 
donor community (where differences of opinion 
exist), and opinion formers such as the OECD, 
is the concern that food aid programmes could 
be counterproductive or even contribute to long-
term food insecurity in recipient countries.  
However, food aid is also contentious among 
the development ‘stakeholders’ (such the UN, 
LDC governments and influential NGOs, such 
as the World Food Programme), whose primary 
concerns relate to the effectiveness of food aid as 
a development tool.  Here, food aid is seen as 
something of a ‘mixed blessing’, helping 
substantially in some instances but having 
perverse effects in others. The critique in this 
context is the potential for causing producer 
disincentives in low-income countries, or of 
disrupting commercial trade. There have also been 
disagreements over the desirability of using 
genetically modified foods in the midst of 
humanitarian crises. 
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Finally, the debate is also more recently being joined 
by influential critics of the current food aid system 
from the international economic community and 
organisations such as the World Bank and in debates 
around the WTO, from the perspective of economic 
efficiency. Here the concerns revolve around 
inappropriate use of food aid – either to pursue donor 
self-interest or as a form of covert export subsidy – 
which causes the system to under-perform in its core 
role of getting food into situations of drought or 
famine where food is unavailable and markets cannot 
function reliably to deliver it quickly enough to 
sustain human lives.  
This policy brief provides an overview of the 
magnitude and importance of food aid as a 
development tool, and looks at whether the efficiency 
problem is intrinsic to food aid, or whether it arises 
from donor-country policies that tend to misuse food 
aid – in some cases for purposes for which it is 
demonstrably not effective – for example to support 
domestic farm prices, to promote commercial 
agricultural exports, to maintain a viable maritime 
industry or even to advance geo-strategic aims.  
Background and major trends in food aid 
flows 
From its early beginnings in the 1960s, in terms of 
absolute volume, food aid peaked around the 1980s at 
just under $4 billion. These amounts have now 
declined dramatically to less than one-tenth of 1980 
levels in 2004. But the relative decline has been more 
dramatic still. From a share of over 25% of all 
development assistance in 1980, food aid accounted 
for around only 5% of total overseas development aid 
(ODA) in 2004. This relative decline is of course also 
partly a result of the almost four-fold expansion of 
total ODA assistance during that period.  
The scope of total provision of food aid amounted to 
roughly 180 million tonnes in the period of 1988 to 
2002. Within that timeframe, food aid was received 
by 148 countries across the globe with quantities of 
very uneven distribution. The fact that almost 70 
countries received food aid in every year over that 
period simply indicates that food aid seems to be a 
longer-term issue for needy countries. The major 
recipients during this period were Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia and Russia, with each receiving 
approximately 7% of the total. In addition, more than 
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half of all food aid was delivered to 14 countries 
while further 89 countries were in receipt of 10%, 
leaving 42 countries sharing the remaining 17%.  
Over the past 40 years, however, as donor 
governments’ farm policies have evolved, thereby 
reducing or eliminating most public food stockpiles, 
this sort of ‘programme’ food aid has waned. 
Nevertheless, it is now claimed by development 
stakeholders and NGOs alike that, as the majority of 
food aid is now ‘tied’ to conditions set by donor 
countries, its real cost is roughly half as much again 
as the equivalent local food purchase and around one-
third more costly than if it was procured in another 
nearby developing country.  
Taken together, such anomalies are thought to reduce 
the effectiveness of food aid by at least one-third 
against other forms of overseas development 
assistance (ODA), i.e. providing tied food aid instead 
of financing commercial imports. (WFP, 2005) 
Hence food aid is a complex issue, because it is as 
much a political concern as it is an economic one. 
The complexity arises from the fact that a judgement 
about which food aid system is best used for any 
particular development provision is usually not based 
on solely economic grounds, but on a political 
decision that largely ignores economic issues, or 
concerns for efficiency. Hence, decisions on food aid 
are generally regarded as political.  
In analysing the effectiveness of food aid, we first 
describe and assess the three different kinds of food 
aid used, which have differing impacts on donors and 
recipient countries. We will see that these distinctions 
in turn have an impact on the crucial procurement 
and dispatch policies – an assessment of which is 
required in order to determine food aid’s 
effectiveness. 
Not only are the three kinds of food aid procured 
differently, it becomes important to judge the 
procurement of food aid in the light of its 
conditionality, whether it is tied or untied, before 
assessing sourcing issues or potential barriers to 
greater efficiency in procurement and delivery.  
Food aid procurement 
Central to an analysis of the effectiveness of food aid 
is the procurement of it, because taken together with 
the definitions of which food aid types are employed, 
the conditionality of procuring food aid determines 
the effectiveness of delivering it, whereas the 
different food aid types determine how food aid is 
targeted. 
There are three major classifications of food aid, with 
each serving a slightly different purpose and attaining 
varying degrees of effectiveness. The three general 
types are:  
  emergency (or relief) food aid, which is targeted 
and freely distributed to victims of natural and 
man-made disasters;  
  project food aid (including monetised food aid), 
which is targeted to vulnerable groups to improve 
their nutritional status and to support specific 
developmental activities; and  
  programme food aid, which is provided directly 
to a recipient government or its agent for sales in 
local markets, the proceeds of which are under the 
control of the recipient government but are subject 
to some form of agreement with the donor about 
their management and use.  
Procurement of food aid is often seen as one of the 
main sticking points in the entire debate. The reason 
for this is the often-cited argument that food aid is 
not just simply off-loading of excess supply and 
hence non-competitively sourced, and in particular in 
the US, where food aid is tied to a number of 
conditions, namely that it has to be sourced from the 
US and delivered and packe d  b y  U S  v e s s e l s  a n d  
labour (Barrett, 2002; OECD, 2004; IAP, 2005). This 
practice means to that the current arrangements of 
procuring food aid operate at a less than optimal level 
of efficiency and a greatly reduced effectiveness of 
food aid. 
Critics of the status quo in procuring food aid state 
that unless the procurement regime is changed, food 
aid will continue to cause trade distortions and it will 
also fall short of its expected optimal effectiveness. A 
start in this debate would be to untie all food aid. The 
debate about untying of food aid has been taken up as 
the subject of numerous studies (Hilditch, 2001; 
FAO, 2004; Outterside et al., 2004), almost all of 
which concluded that a complete untying of food aid 
would be beneficial and would increase the level of 
efficiency. 
The (un)tying of food aid 
According to some OECD figures, the untying of 
food aid worldwide could increase its effectiveness 
by between 15-25%, and the untying European food 
aid in particular (both multilateral and bilateral) could 
result in 350-600 thousand tonnes of grain equivalent 
food aid per annum (OECD, 2004). 
The way in which food aid is delivered influences its 
tying status. By its very nature, food aid given ‘in 
kind’ is tied. Donors have been providing food aid in 
a number of ways – 21% bilaterally, 28% through 
NGOs and 51% through multilateral institutions 
(99% of which is via the UN’s World Food The Food Aid Debate in Trade and Development | 3 
 
Programme).
4 European food aid is primarily donated 
through multilateral agencies, with some passing 
through NGOs. However, even when provided 
through multilateral channels, food aid can still be 
(and is) tied. This provides the challenge to further 
untie food aid, to make it more effective and neutral 
in its impact on trade. 
To be truly effective and fully untied, food needs to 
be provided as grants rather than conditionally ‘in 
kind’, which prevents recipient countries from 
utilising food aid to their long-term, sustainable 
advantage. 
But the US – as the biggest ‘opponent’ to untying 
food aid but also the largest provider of food aid – is 
required by legislation to provide it both ‘in kind’ and 
tied. The farm lobbies in the US, comprising the 
National Farm Bureau, the National Farmers Union 
and National Family Farms Coalition, exert immense 
political pressure on both the US Government and the 
international donor community to maintain this level 
of tying. It is in their vested interest that food will be 
purchased domestically, as it provides a guaranteed 
purchase of agricultural commodities and hence 
guarantees farm revenues. This is precisely the 
reason food aid has been placed at the forefront of the 
current WTO negotiations, because it is seen as a 
domestic farm subsidy rather than as a genuine 
provision of aid. 
The present DDA negotiations seem to be addressing 
this political dimension. Partly as a result of peer 
pressure from the EU, food aid has become an 
integral part of these negotiations, forcing it into the 
political spotlight. 
One option presently under discussion is to place 
food aid under the ‘parallelism’ discipline of the 
WTO. This would have the benefit that food aid 
would be treated in the negotiations as an equal 
agenda item as export subsidies, export credits and 
state trade enterprises. And given that the elimination 
of the export subsidies and credits is being discussed, 
the current food aid system would have to be changed 
as well. This in turn would lead to the further untying 
of food aid and to less trade distortion, because trade 
of agricultural products would be further liberalised. 
The prospect of abandoning current trade-distorting 
practices remains uncertain. So far, however, 
sourcing commodities for food aid domestically is a 
form of supporting local producers and effectively 
circumvents the WTO.  
The EU is in a good position to achieve full untying 
of food aid, partly because European food aid does 
not form a large proportion of bilateral budgets. Most 
EU member states already make use of untied 
                                                        
4 According to 2002 figures. 
delivery channels, such as through multilateral 
agencies or by direct support to a recipient 
government. The European Community strongly 
promotes the sourcing of food aid in developing 
countries, as called for in the Food Aid Regulation 
(EU, 2004).  
Reciprocity in the food aid sector could offer the EU 
an opportunity to influence/persuade others to follow. 
Given the already significant untied status of 
European food aid, it would be sensible to consider 
ways to achieving full untying.  
By looking at procurement (and the three definitions) 
we acknowledge that food aid is best procured with 
no conditionality attached, i.e. untied. It is also 
apparent that untied food aid should be given in form 
of project food aid, ideally for monetisation, since it 
is the most cost-effective way of delivering food aid.  
Nevertheless, our review of the trends suggests that 
the use of project food aid is growing, because it can 
be increasingly procured untied. Conversely, 
programme food aid has a greater conditionality 
attached, but it has been favoured up till now because 
of its use of domestic surplus. 
Effectiveness of food aid 
Evaluating the degree of effectiveness of food aid is 
presently a divisive issue within the donor 
community, since many governments prefer an 
assessment based on food aid deliveries rather than 
on its effectiveness in recipient countries. The issue 
also splits stakeholders such as the NGOs and the 
Food Aid Organisation. This is partly because any 
assessment is often based on a populist sentiment, 
rather than on careful economic analysis. However, 
one difference is that the latter approach tends to be 
more concerned with improving food supply 
conditions in recipient countries. 
Even a recent OECD study, which aimed to rank 
food aid types according to their degree of 
effectiveness – and/or import displacement – 
concluded that the issue was far from straightforward 
(OECD, 2005). The OECD focuses on the ‘value-for-
money’ approach to the overall costs of supply and 
compares individual donor country actions with an 
alternative commercial transaction that could have 
been supplied by an OECD or another developing 
country on a least-cost basis. Here, the idea of 
‘import parity’ provided a general basis for assessing 
cost-effectiveness.  
The study supports the case being made in the present 
paper, namely that the most cost-effective way of 
delivering food aid is project aid, and in particular 
project aid for monetisation. The OECD study also 
confirms the widespread view that untying aid is the 
preferred option, and cited the US as having the 4 | Andreas Schneider 
 
highest resource transfer efficiency ratio, or 
otherwise put, the least cost-effective sourcing. This 
is not surprising, since this outcome is associated 
with the relatively high US cost levels for direct 
transfers of tied aid. The OECD study concludes that 
the most cost-effective donors are those that have 
untied their food aid, or have the least restrictive 
procurement rules. This is also observed at the 
recipient end, where typically direct transfers (tied 
aid) are less cost-effective than triangular or local 
purchases. 
Conclusions 
One can assert that the current system of food aid is 
effective but that it could be better. The rules of the 
WTO and for other agencies involved in delivering 
food aid should be changed to achieve more 
effectiveness. As the world’s largest food aid donor 
by far, the United States could help more people, in a 
more timely fashion, at lower cost to American 
taxpayers, if the Congress would make a few key 
changes to the current system.  
Our analysis suggests that food aid per se is not a 
wasteful way to help the poor if it is procured and 
targeted in an efficient way. This is the core finding 
of this study, which suggests that if food aid is 
granted in the form of project food aid  for 
monetisation and completely untied and targeted in 
an efficient manner, it can be an effective way of 
alleviating hunger, while having minimal effects on 
trade and local production. 
Inter alia, we have observed the following recent 
trends: 
  There has been a decline in the absolute amount 
of ‘additional’ food aid. 
  Food aid is less important also in relative terms, 
as is the proportion of food aid in total ODA. 
  The emergence of tied food aid means that it is 
important to be clear on the three definitions of 
food aid and their relative components in total 
food aid. 
  The relationship between food aid type and 
procurement and delivery practices have 
implications for the tied vs. untied debate. 
The analysis undertaken demonstrates that – of the 
three food aid types - project food aid is the only one 
that can be provided with few or no conditions 
attached. This is reasonably encouraging, as project 
food aid now accounts for 16½% of total food aid 
and is growing in importance. As also discussed, it is 
the conditions attached to food aid – rather than any 
intrinsic defects – which act as a barrier to its more 
effective use, as these conditions affect the targeting 
and delivery of the food aid.  
The further untying of food aid in general (all types) 
could result in a 15-25% increase in efficiency. This 
would be achieved by a decrease in cost of sourcing, 
as local purchases or triangular transactions are 
always more cost-effective than direct transfers and 
hence leading to an increase in efficiency.  
Untying project food aid in particular would deliver 
the largest efficiency benefits for donor and recipient 
countries alike. This is because donors with a large 
amount of tied aid have high levels of transfer 
efficiency but this is associated with high costs; but 
lower overall cost effectiveness as the food could be 
sourced more cheaply elsewhere. Turning to recipient 
country efficiency, however, we could not 
substantiate the frequently-made claim that food aid 
automatically leads to agricultural market distortions 
or barriers to local production. This suggests that 
food aid per se is not the problem so long as it is 
effectively targeted and sourced. 
Further to these ‘economic’ arguments, 
understanding the political dimension is crucial if we 
wish to pursue a better food aid regime. The lack of 
political will to change the present regime 
exacerbates the current (but not inevitable) economic 
distortion in food aid. Covert protectionist behaviour 
on the part of donor countries, driven by strong 
agricultural lobbies, attaches sourcing and delivery 
conditions which contribute to any inherent economic 
difficulties. Despite some signs that there is a general 
understanding that this behaviour may not be 
sustainable, a clear and far-reaching strategy to move 
towards untied project food aid is still lacking.  
It is this lack of political will at the international 
institutional level that pervades the food aid debate. 
The present institutions, such as the FAO and the 
FAC, have proved to be successful in delivering food 
aid but lack the power to challenge donor behaviour 
in the sourcing of food aid.  
The fact that these institutions are relatively 
powerless to influence strongly established  donor 
practices lies behind recent suggestions that the WTO 
(as a stronger multilateral institution) should take a 
more central role in this debate, by placing food aid 
under a ‘parallel discipline’ on a par with export 
subsidy measures for other, non-food goods and 
commodities. This would force donors to change 
their food aid regimes. In addition, a stronger and 
new body would be needed to oversee food aid 
administration.  
The rationale for these conclusions, as shown in this 
study, is that food aid can be compliant with 
effectiveness, if it is provided mainly (or more so 
than at the present time) in the form of untied project 
food aid. This desirable outcome would tend to be 
compliant with WTO rules, if the food aid were The Food Aid Debate in Trade and Development | 5 
 
placed under the ‘parallel discipline’ which is used at 
the WTO to address trade-distorting issues.  
Considering the small percentage of food aid in 
overall ODA terms, it remains to be seen whether 
sufficient political momentum can be generated by 
donor countries to change the rules of the food aid 
debate. It may yet be possible for food aid to be 
treated as a ‘bargaining chip’ in the present WTO 
negotiations, as a tool to be traded off in the ongoing 
DDA by some donors in order to secure other 
interests, e.g. geographical indicators versus food aid.  
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